United States

Across cultures, people use natural and supernatural explanations to explain adverse life events, such as illness or death. Yet little is known about the psychological implications of this type of causal reasoning. Here, we ask, does explanatory coexistence help or hinder coping with significant misfortune? We examined this question through structured interviews with a diverse sample of 147 Los Angelinos who had suffered from severe illness or bereavement during the COVID-19 pandemic. As predicted, mean scores on the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory were significantly higher for participants who employed coexisting explanations for their misfortune than those who employed singular explanations (natural, supernatural) alone. These findings provide evidence of an association between coexistence reasoning about misfortune and positive post-event processing.

CogSci 2023

Coexistence Reasoning about Misfortune During COVID-19 is Associated with Positive Psychological Well-Being

### Welcome to CogSci Conference 2025!

The 47th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society was a hybrid meeting held in San Francisco. 

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#### About

The Cognitive Science Society brings together researchers from around the world who hold a common goal: understanding the nature of the human mind. The mission of the Society is to promote Cognitive Science as a discipline, and to foster scientific interchange among researchers in various areas of study, including Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, Anthropology, Psychology, Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Education.

The Society is a non-profit professional organization and its activities include sponsoring an annual conference and publishing the journals Cognitive Science and TopiCS.

#### Our History 

* **Society Creation**<br>
The Society was incorporated as a 501(c)(3) non-profit professional organization in Massachusetts in 1979. The organizing committee included Roger Schank, Allan Collins, Donald Norman, and a number of other scholars from psychology, linguistics, computer science, and philosophy. 
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* **Conference Creation**<br>
The first conference on cognitive science was held at La Jolla, California in August, 1979, and has occurred annually since then. The proceedings of each conference are published, and those from most years are available through Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. The annual proceedings of the Cognitive Science Conference represent a major source of information on new work and new ideas in the scientific study of thinking. In 1990, the Society, with help from an anonymous donor, established the David Marr Prize for the best student paper at each annual meeting.
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* **Journal Creation**<br>
The Journal, Cognitive Science, began publication in 1976, and is now published by Wiley-Blackwell. The Executive Editor is currently Richard P. Cooper of Birkbeck, University of London, and there are 18 Associate Editors and a 30-member editorial board. It serves as the premier outlet for research reports that intersect two or more disciplines. Copyrights for articles published in the journal are held by the Society. The Governing Board of the Cognitive Science Society voted in late 2006 to found a new journal, Topics in Cognitive Science (topiCS). The Editor in Chief is Wayne Gray, Cognitive Science Department, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The journal seeks to fill a niche not occupied by Cognitive Science Journal or other cognitive science journals. Membership in the Society includes a subscription to Cognitive Science and TopiCS. Copyrights for articles published in the journal are held by the Society.
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#### Code of Conduct

By attending the CogSci 2025 Conference, you are required to adhere to the society’s **[Code of Conduct](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ChPuihLy6jE_BWqfO7J2KKgX35JW2zsM/view?usp=sharing)**.
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CogSci 2025

The 47th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society presents the latest research across cognitive science and highlights the theme of Cognition in Context.

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The 45th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society will take place in Sydney, Australia as a modified hybrid conference. Presentations from the main-session room will be live-streamed every day for all events. This will include all invited talks and award sessions. Recordings of all CogSci 2023 sessions will be made available for on-demand viewing after the conference.<br>
The in-person component will be held at the International Convention Centre Sydney at Darling Harbour. The Conference will take place Wednesday July 26th – Saturday July 29th, 2023 (Wednesday, July 26th is the Workshops Day).

Join us!

<br>[**The Program at a Glance can be found here**](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/COgSci-PAAG-V2.pdf)
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#### **CogSci 2023 Program Book**
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The 45th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society presents the latest research across cognitive science and highlights the theme of Cognition in Context.

How responsible someone is for an outcome depends on both the causal role of their actions, and what those actions reveal about their moral character. Prior work has successfully modeled people's causal attributions and mental state inferences using planning algorithms assumed to approximate people's intuitive theory of mind about others' behavior. In this paper, we develop a unified computational framework for responsibility judgments in which the same generative planner can model both of these processes. We test our framework on a variety of animated social scenarios in two experiments. Experiment 1 features simple cases of helping and hindering. Experiment 2 features more complex interactions that require recursive reasoning, including cases where one agent affects another by merely signaling their intentions without physically acting on the world. Our model accurately captures participants' counterfactual simulations and intention inferences. Together, these two factors explain responsibility judgments.

A computational framework for responsibility judgments from counterfactual simulations and intention inferences

Causal pluralism proposes that humans can reason about causes and effects in terms of both dependency and process relations, depending on the scenario. Empirical support for this view is provided by responses to double prevention scenarios in which an actor attempts to bring about an outcome, a preventer attempts to prevent the outcome, and a double preventer intervenes to stop the preventer’s prevention attempt. In contrast to the predictions of the causal pluralism account, two pre-registered experiments (Ns = 400 and 450) indicate (a) that intentional actions are judged to be significantly more causative of an outcome than unintentional actions for both the actor and the double preventer and (b) that reasoners interpret the double preventer’s link to the outcome in terms of a process relation. These results underscore the need to revisit fundamental questions regarding how reasoners form and reason over representations of causal scenarios featuring intentional actions.

Revisiting Causal Pluralism: Intention, Process, and Dependency in Cases of Double Prevention

A causal illusion occurs when people perceive a causal relationship between two events that are not contingent on each other. How this illusion varies when people reason diagnostically (i.e., in an effect-to-cause direction) is not well known. Thus, this experiment explored how diagnostic reasoning affects causal illusions. Participants learnt about a illusory cause-effect relationship in which the probability of the cause and the probability of the effect were orthogonally manipulated to be either high or low. Participants learnt either predictively (i.e., cause-to-effect) or diagnostically, and at test had to make two causal judgements that encouraged either predictive (cause-to-effect) or diagnostic (effect-to-cause) reasoning. Diagnostic reasoning at test increased the strength of the cause density bias and decreased the strength of the effect density bias. It also decreased causal ratings, but only after predictive learning. These findings highlight the promise of diagnostic reasoning as a tool to debias causal decision making.

Question Framing Modulates the Cause Density and Effect Density Biases in Causal Illusions

Many methods exist to learn causal models from data, as causal relationships form the basis for successful actions. These methods are frequently evaluated based on the completeness of the models they can infer. Yet, there is a gap between the highly complete and potentially complex models algorithms can learn and the types of information people can use successfully to make decisions. To address this we conduct two experiments to understand how the size and features of causal models influence how well they can be used for decision-making. In Experiment 1 we systematically vary model size for a series of topics, finding that there is a negative and linear relationship between causal model size and decision accuracy. In Experiment 2 we examine how model structure influences decisions, varying whether the models include feedback loops, again finding that smaller models lead to better choices, and that feedback loops are also beneficial.

Quantifying the Utility of Causal Models for Decision-Making

Infants must balance interacting with a caregiver and navigating the environment, driven by their curiosity and attachment. This decision involves trading off proximity seeking with the caregiver and novelty seeking in the surroundings. Our hypothesis is that different attachment styles may arise as adaptive reward-seeking strategies based on different frequencies and scales of rewards from both caregiver and environment, including negative rewards due to distressing encounters. We implement a computational model using a reinforcement learning framework to model infants’ attachment and exploratory behaviors as a bandit problem. We study how infants’ exploratory behaviors emerge as they learn from their caregiver and how these learned behaviors transfer to a new caregiver. Our work expands upon existing computational models of attachment and models how social factors can influence curiosity-seeking as infants learn to explore versus exploit.

Reinforcement learning models of tradeoffs between infant attachment and curiosity

Categorical biases in working memory (WM) can impact our recollection of visual stimuli. These are often biased towards or away from category prototypes. Color naming data can be used to predict biases in behavioral and neural data, suggesting sensory WM is affected by the use of verbal labels.

We investigated a possible link between categorical biases and verbal labels for orientation and spatial WM. Forty subjects performed standard orientation and spatial WM tasks, and were later prompted to freely label the stimuli. 

Accuracy is significantly higher when recalling cardinal locations and orientations compared to non-cardinal ones. This contrast is also evidenced by subject-unique neural activity patterns. The behavioral error pattern resembled verbal labeling strategies: Terms for cardinal stimuli were used sparsely and precisely (e.g. vertical, horizontal) while terms describing non-cardinal stimuli were used liberally (e.g. diagonal). Cardinal biases in WM stimuli might result from the use of categorical, verbal representations.

Does visual working memory rely on categorical and verbal neural representations?

High-quality parent language may support preschoolers’ language development by shaping underlying neurodevelopment. Indeed, more interactive language relates to higher frontal brain activity (Romeo et al., 2018). However, it remains to be explored whether other features of parent language may also be related to brain activity. This study examined whether parental linguistic sophistication is related to children’s spontaneous high-frequency neural activity, as indexed by EEG gamma power. Transcripts of parent-child dyads (N=36, children M=4.1 years old) completing a puzzle task were analyzed for mean length of utterance (measure of grammatical complexity) and number of different words (measure of vocabulary sophistication). We found that higher parental mean length of utterance was related to higher regional EEG gamma power (F(2.61,80.78)=2.92, p=.046), suggesting that more grammatically complex parent language is linked with higher child neural maturity. Future studies should explore the directionality of this finding and further measures of parent language quality.

Sophisticated parent language is linked to high-frequency neural activity in preschoolers

Spatial navigation is supported by the combined activity of brain regions in the human navigation network (HNN) that integrates environmental information across complementary egocentric and allocentric reference frames. Despite humans mainly relying on vision to navigate space, the impact of early visual deprivation on the HNN is mostly unknown. In our experiment sighted and early blind participants were tested in two tasks of imagined navigation while undergoing fMRI. Results show, on the one hand, that both sighted and blind activated regions of the HNN during navigation, with no differences between groups. On the other hand, quadrature filter analysis in the entorhinal cortex, a crucial region for the creation of cognitive maps, revealed an alteration of grid-like coding in early blind individuals, which might be correlated to the adoption of egocentric-like strategies to navigate in space.

Altered grid-like coding in early blind people during imagined navigation

World-wide, millions experience mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) annually, which may lead to persistent neurobehavioral symptoms (NBS). Post-mTBI speed of processing studies have shown mixed results, but few have examined NBS. A novel ERP task examined the relationship between NBS, mTBI, and target detection performance. P300 latency and amplitude, response time (RTs) and accuracy were measured from community-dwelling adults with (+mTBI n=18; Female 12) and without mTBI (-mTBI n=21; Female 11). The Neurobehavioral Symptom Inventory (NSI) measured self-reported NBS. We expected +mTBI to show increased P300 latencies and RTs. No differences were observed between +mTBI and -mTBI on RTs, P300 amplitude or latency. However, increased symptomatology, regardless of mTBI status, predicted slower target RTs, R2 = 0.125, F (1, 37) = 5.296, p = 0.027, β = 0.354. Our findings suggest that researchers and clinicians should consider NBS when assessing processing speed complications in mTBI.

Neurobehavioral symptomatology predicts response times during target detection but not the P300: a multi-method study of mild traumatic brain injury

ASD children are characterised by their refusal to change and difficulty in changing their responses to different social situations, which make it difficult for them to communicate with others, including their parents. We applied the comprehensive care technique Humanitude™ to mothers of children with ASD to support them from a multimodal communication perspective.
Changes in mother-child communication were analysed in terms of mother-child gaze and the time the mother and child spent playing together. The results indicate that after the Humanitude™ intervention, there were significant differences in eye contact, mothers looking at their children, and children looking at their mothers. There was also a significant decrease in time children spent playing alone. There was a high correlation between pre and post-Humanitude™ intervention in the amount of time both mothers and children spent looking at each other, which suggests that incorporating multimodal communication can affect communication between parents and children.

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A computational framework for responsibility judgments from counterfactual simulations and intention inferences

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