United Kingdom

Conversational agents have been widely adopted in dialogue systems for various business purposes. Many existing conversational agents are rule-based and require significant human intervention to adapt the knowledge and conversational flow. In this paper, we propose a graph-based adaptive conversational agent model which is capable of learning knowledge from human beings and adapting the knowledge-base according to human-agent interactions. Studies to evaluate the proposed model are conducted and presented, which compare the responses from the proposed adaptive agent model and a conventional agent.

AAMAS 2021

Graph-based Self-Adaptive Conversational Agent

## Welcome to 2024 Annual Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics!
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The University of Texas at Austin 
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NAACL 2024

2024 Annual Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics

poster

AAMAS is the largest and most influential conference in the area of agents and multiagent systems, bringing together researchers and practitioners in all areas of agent technology and providing and internationally renowned high-profile forum for publishing and finding out about the latest developments in the field. AAMAS is the flagship conference of the non-profit International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).  

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Strategic diversity is often essential in games: in multi-player games, for example, evaluating a player against a diverse set of strategies will yield a more accurate estimate of its performance. Furthermore, in games with non-transitivities diversity allows a player to cover several winning strategies. However, despite the significance of strategic diversity, training agents that exhibit diverse behaviour remains a challenge. In this paper we study how to construct diverse populations of agents by carefully structuring how individuals within a population interact. Our approach is based on interaction graphs, which control the flow of information between agents during training and can encourage agents to specialise on different strategies, leading to improved overall performance. We provide evidence for the importance of diversity in multi-agent training and analyse the effect of applying different interaction graphs on the training trajectories, diversity and performance of populations in a range of games.

Pick Your Battles: Interaction Graphs as Population-Level Objectives for Strategic Diversity

Distributed multi-agent learning enables agents to cooperatively train a model without requiring to share their datasets. While this setting ensures some level of privacy, it has been shown that, even when data is not directly shared, the training process is vulnerable to privacy attacks including data reconstruction and model inversion attacks. Additionally, malicious agents that train on inverted labels or random data, may arbitrarily weaken the accuracy of the global model. This paper addresses these challenges and presents Privacy-preserving and Accountable Distributed Learning (PA-DL), a fully decentralized framework that relies on Differential Privacy to guarantee strong privacy protection of the agents data, and Ethereum smart contracts to ensure accountability.

Privacy-Preserving and Accountable Multi-agent Learning

SARSA-RS is a reward shaping method that updates the shaping through learning. However, the bottleneck of this method is the aggregation of states since designers need to design mappings from all states to abstract states. We propose a dynamic trajectory aggregation that uses subgoal series. The designer's effort becomes minimal because only human input is the subgoal series. This makes application to environments with high-dimensional observations possible. We compared our method by using participants' subgoal series with a baseline reinforcement learning algorithm and other subgoal-based methods in a navigation task. As a result, our reward shaping outperformed all other methods in learning efficiency.

Online Learning of Shaping Reward with Subgoal Knowledge

Competitive Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are inherently hard to control due to agent autonomy and strategic behavior, which is particularly problematic when there are system-level objectives to be achieved or specific environmental states to be avoided.

Toward a Self-Learning Governance Loop for Competitive Multi-Attribute MAS

Large scale multiagent systems must rely on distributed decision making, as centralized coordination is either impractical or impossible. Recent works approach this problem under a game theoretic lens, whereby utility functions are assigned to each of the agents with the hope that their local optimization approximates the centralized optimal solution. Yet, formal guarantees on the resulting performance cannot be obtained for broad classes of problems without compromising on their accuracy. In this work, we address this concern relative to the well-studied problem of resource allocation with nondecreasing concave welfare functions. We show that optimally designed local utilities achieve an approximation ratio (price of anarchy) of 1-c/e, where c is the function's curvature and e is Euler's constant. The upshot of our contributions is the design of approximation algorithms that are distributed and efficient, and whose performance matches that of the best existing polynomial-time (and centralized) schemes.

Tractable Mechanisms for Computing Near-Optimal Utility Functions

Sequential decision making techniques hold great promise to improve the performance of many real-world systems, but computational complexity hampers their principled application. Influence-based abstraction aims to gain leverage by modeling local subproblems together with the 'influence' that the rest of the system exerts on them. While computing exact representations of such influence might be intractable, learning approximate representations offers a promising approach to enable scalable solutions. This paper investigates the performance of such approaches from a theoretical perspective. The primary contribution is the derivation of sufficient conditions on approximate influence representations that can guarantee solutions with small value loss. In particular we show that neural networks trained with cross entropy are well suited to learn approximate influence representations. Moreover, we provide a sample based formulation of the bounds, which reduces the gap to applications. Finally, driven by our theoretical insights, we propose approximation error estimators, which empirically reveal to correlate well with the value loss.

Loss Bounds for Approximate Influence-Based Abstraction

The literature in modern machine learning has only negative results for learning to communicate between competitive agents using standard RL. We introduce a modified sender-receiver game to study the spectrum of partially-competitive scenarios and show communication can indeed emerge in a competitive setting. We empirically demonstrate three key takeaways for future research. First, we show that communication is proportional to cooperation, and it can occur for partially competitive scenarios using standard learning algorithms. Second, we highlight the difference between communication and manipulation and extend previous metrics of communication to the competitive case. Third, we investigate the negotiation game where previous work failed to learn communication between independent agents (Cao et al, 2018). We show that, in this setting, both agents must benefit from communication for it to emerge; and, with a slight modification to the game, we demonstrate successful communication between competitive agents. We hope this work overturns misconceptions and inspires more research in competitive emergent communication. Code is available at http://github.com/mnoukhov/emergent-compete

Emergent Communication under Competition

A set of players delegate playing a game to a set of representatives, one for each player. We imagine that each player trusts their respective representative's strategic abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the original players would simply instruct the representatives to play the original game as best as they can. In this paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that the original players can coordinate to tell their representatives to only consider some subset of the available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes differently than the original players. Then can the original players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for all the original players? In particular, can they Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show that under some specific assumptions about how the representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements is NP-complete.

Safe Pareto Improvements for Delegated Game Playing

The problem of finding pure strategy Nash equilibria in multiagent concurrent games with finite-horizon temporal goals has received some recent attention. Earlier work solved this problem through the use of Rabin automata. In this work, we take advantage of the finite-horizon nature of the agents' goals and show that checking for and finding pure strategy Nash equilibria can be done using a combination of safety games and lasso testing in B&#252;chi automata. To separate strategic reasoning from temporal reasoning, we model agents' goals by deterministic finite-word automata (DFAs), since finite-horizon logics such as LTLf and LDLf are reasoned about through conversion to equivalent DFAs. This allow us characterize the complexity of the problem as PSPACE complete.

Nash Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Multiagent Concurrent Games

Embodied conversational agents (ECAs) benefit from non-verbal behavior for natural and efficient interaction with users. Gesticulation -- hand and arm movements accompanying speech -- is an essential part of non-verbal behavior. Gesture generation models have been developed for several decades: starting with rule-based and ending with mainly data-driven methods. To date, recent end-to-end gesture generation methods have not been evaluated in a real-time interaction with users. We present a proof-of-concept framework, which is intended to facilitate evaluation of modern gesture generation models in interaction.

Next from AAMAS 2021

Pick Your Battles: Interaction Graphs as Population-Level Objectives for Strategic Diversity

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